By Lucia Kurekova
The experience of several old(er) EU member states shows that the EU structural funds are an important developmental tool for the less developed parts of Europe. In relation to the administration of the EU funds, Slovakia has recently been dealing with the so called ‘notice board tender’ (nastenkovy tender) which is an appalling case of the fraud of EU structural funds along party cronyism lines connected to the Ministry of Development and Construction and the Slovak National Party. The scandal broke out in full speed already last October but it was not until Brussels blew the whistle loud enough, threatening to stop the flow of the EU funds to the country, that some political accountability and redress were taken. What is interesting about the notice board case is the fact that the irregularities were pointed out very early on by a member of the Monitoring Committee for the Operational Program Technical Assistance 2007-2013 in the framework of which the tender took place. Rather than discussing the controversiality of the politics of the above developments, I would like to talk about Monitoring Committees which is a mechanism that allows scrutinizing the ways of EU funds allocation, but due to various reasons is not used to its fullest potential.
Monitoring Committees (MCs) are organs that exist alongside each Operational Program (OP) in every EU member state. The existence of MCs is stipulated by the Council Regulation (EC) 1260/1999 which defines basis principles on which it should be organized. However, an individual Ministry that runs the OP and to that related MC (Managing Authority) has much discretion in respect to the composition of the MC, the execution of its roles and the level of internal democracy. Because the MC is required to have members from local and regional governments but also representatives from the civic sector, one of important potential side-effects of the MC lies in the establishment of partnership principle. The general idea behind the work of the MCs, however, is to create national-level mechanism of accountability and control over the management and distribution of EU structural funds. The MCs usually meet several times a year. The minutes from the meetings are normally available publicly on the web pages of particular OPs. In the case of ‘notice board’ scandal, the minutes from June 2008 provide evidence of how a representative of the NGO sector in the MC demanded more information about the tender and was silenced by the Chair.
As part of a research project conducted at CEU, I had a chance to inquire into how a particular MC which distributes finances from the European Social Fund in Slovakia functions and I would like to share with you a set of general findings. The research revealed that the perceptions about the functions of the MC and understanding of what ‘monitoring’ means differ widely among the members of that MC. It was interesting to discover that the members seem to have internalized some of the not necessarily transparent aspects of how the MC functioned, which included non-accessibility of the minutes from their meetings to public. Generally, the members were not in favor of revealing what the problems and deficiencies in the administration of the ESF were to the wider public, justifying their stand on the grounds of disinterest on the part of the public and/or incapability to understand complex processes of EU funds administration. For most of them, efficiency (allocating as much funds as possible) seemed to be more important than transparency. Surprisingly, however, this relative stealth co-existed with a great degree of internal critique in respect to the Managing Authority from the non-governmental side but also from the other ministries that were members of the MC.
For the non-governmental members, the presence in the MC has proven crucial in lobbying for the interests of the groups of society they were representing and for most of them, unfortunately, that is how far their input into the monitoring part went. Interestingly, some members pointed out that the rate of activity and substantive input of the representatives from non-governmental sector has decreased with time and is generally much lower in the second programming period than it was in the first one (2004-2006). Nevertheless, part of the NGO sector took their potential effect in MCs seriously and proactively addressed the government when the MCs for the new programming periods were being created. The government responded in a very lukewarm fashion to the proposals of NGO sector for independent nominations to the MC and in several cases the ministries selected members of (marginal) NGOs with favorable leaning towards the current Slovak government, proactively ‘preventing’ problems that might arise by too active scrutiny from the more critically tuned NGOs.
In sum, it seems that while the MCs have the potential to be a tool of effective control over the administration of the EU funds and to connect different levels of the society, it is not fully utilized towards making the EU funds work better, with greater transparency and more efficiently. It seems that in this instance clearer and more specific guidelines on the part of the EU regulation in respect to the rules of the composition of Monitoring Committees could actually serve well. Making Monitoring Committees real watchdogs over accountability, control and dialogue leading to greater efficiency and transparency should therefore become a real effort.
May 10, 2009
Observations about the administration of EU Structural Funds (in CEE)
Mar 15, 2009
Anti-crisis policies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: what do they have in common?
By Lucia Kurekova and Katka Svickova
Czech Republic and Slovakia have diverged in their developmental paths and policy choices over the course of transition. In spite of common institutional legacy and very similar export profiles, sixteen years after separation, the policy choices frequently differ, perhaps not least because of opposing political orientations of their governing elites during different periods of transition. This is the case also today, when individual countries are facing the world economic downturn in their local shapes and forms: Slovakia is governed by social democratic/third way SMER in coalition with centre-right HZDS and nationalist SNS while the Czech Republic is headed by a centre-right government of Miroslav Topolanek. In spite of many similarities in how the crisis has been affecting these two countries, which are both heavily dependent on automotive industry, the remedies that the governments have passed are quite different.
The governments of both countries, however, shared a similar initial denial that the global crisis might have any significant effects on their domestic economies. In both countries, too, the opposition was coining a different message and suggesting their own recipes for a remedy. And in both countries, the governments have not been really listening to these voices. While the wounds to the economies of both countries have been caused by a deep dip of external demand for their exports of consumer durable goods, the reactions of both countries in the form of adopted anti-crises measures have been different. Is the reason for these different reactions an underlying difference in the state of these economies, as persuasively argued in the last week’s issue of the Economist, or is it purely an outcome of different ideological orientations and tastes of the governments steering the countries?
To summarize, the set of Czech anti-crisis measures has a strong pro-business flavor while the Slovak government has concentrated more on supporting the ‘ordinary citizens’ and keeping employment almost at any cost. Further, while the Czech measures are partially forward-looking and have a modernizing aspect (support for environmental measures, increase of R&D investment), this can hardly be said about any of the three Slovak anti-crisis packages. While the government of Robert Fico fiercely refuted any opposition calls to decrease further the 19% flat tax rate, the “tax package” that it passed in the end will make most of working Slovaks richer by about 10 euro per month via the raised tax deductible minimum. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, will not only reduce the corporate tax by another 2% in the next two years (only reaching, however, the current Slovak level of 19 %) but has also decreased social insurance deductions on salaries for employees by 1,5%. Instead of up to 2000 euro ‘srotovne’ (bonus on buying a new car and recycling an old car) passed after its success in Germany last week also in Slovakia, the Czech Republic decided to reduce the VAT for cars. Additional changes to the administrative and institutional business environment in the Czech Republic include an amendment of the insolvency law, faster depreciations, an abolishment of the obligation to pay an advance on income tax for self-employed and small enterprises (below 5 employees) or enhancing the provision of export loans to businesses and loan guarantees for SMEs. The overall goal is to reduce the cost of labor and thus, desirably, preserve employment and facilitate the cash-flow for businesses. Fairly enough, Slovakia passed a handful of pro-business oriented measures too, among them easier book-keeping for self-employed and SMEs, faster depreciations, a quicker return of VAT to businesses or state guarantees for loans (up to 55% of the loans for companies employing less than 100 people).
However, the core of Slovak anti-crisis tools is in its ‘social package’. The leitmotif of the government is ‘keeping employment at any price’, which is not surprising in the light of the Slovak structural (read “high and persistent”) unemployment nightmare that has been present during the whole transition. Yet the set of job creation measures passed by the government is not only extremely complicated, but there are fears that many of them are very corruption-prone and might lead to more – rather than less - red tape. Measures such as state help to employers who are experiencing serious operational problems to cover the compulsory health and social insurance payments for their employees for a maximum of 60 days, or intentions to subsidize new jobs for a period of 12 months up to 15% of the costs of a new job in Bratislava region and 30% in the other regions of Slovakia are only examples of ways where crony practices and potential waste of money are likely to loom in unless the system is properly monitored and the support is given to enterprises with good prospects of future growth and innovation. The law on the support for one-man businesses started during the crisis, for example, had to be amended shortly after it came into effect following cases of its misuse.
There are a few instances, however, where the countries seem to stand out in a positive way. Bratislava has been praised for keeping its investment incentives to foreign firms - and extending them to domestic investors. Czech Republic, on the other hand, plans to invest more into R&D, a field where nearly every country has been trying to save during the crisis. Both of these measures are forward-looking. And although they are unlikely to act as immediate fire-fighters against the slump, which is projected to be the deepest in the next moths, the countries will be grateful for them in the mid-term to long-term period.
To answer our question from the beginning on the cause of the divergence of policy reactions in the two countries, the color of the governing coalitions seems to explain a lot of the outlined differences. At the same time, however, Slovakia has a long-lasting experience with high unemployment to which the society is extremely sensitive. In addition, both countries will need to deal with the issue of migration, but from very different ends: the Czech Republic is trying to figure out how to send back some of its foreign labor that has served it well until now, while Slovakia should start monitoring who and in which proportions is coming back to the country from nearer (Czech Republic) or farther abroad (Britain and Ireland). Lastly, Slovakia, now an EMU member, is not spending any of its energy on defending its currency, while the Czech Republic is less lucky in its respect. But then – it has one more tool at hands in dealing with the crisis cycle and its exporters are more competitive than the Slovaks exporters.
This brief comparison of reactions to the domestic repercussions of the world economic crisis in two Central and Eastern economies also contributes to underline a broader trend of divergence in the development of the countries from the whole Central and Eastern European region, despite a shared legacy as centrally-planned economies.
Jan 8, 2009
Russians are strangling Europe
[Original published in Slovak on 7.1.2009, translated by Andrej Nosko. Translated and republished with the permission of the author.]
January 2009 marks the end of 40-years-long fair and mutually beneficial energy cooperation between Moscow and Europe. From now on, European customers must be well aware that the Russian partner is not only trading with them, but his priority is promotion of geopolitical interests of the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin, already in March 2000 declared, that "Our work (meaning the export of oil and gas) will be driven by our geo-strategic interests!" Since then, in a targeted and very effective way, the Kremlin uses energy cooperation and the supply of raw materials for the promotion of its foreign policy interests. Brezhnev's doctrine of limited political and [national] security sovereignty for Eastern Europe was replaced by Putin's doctrine of limited energy sovereignty.
The argument that it is primarily a trade dispute between inadequately paying Ukraine, and tough Russia is ultimately wrong and misleading. Regular followers of these issues known, that these tensions have always been present between Ukraine and Russia. But it is only since February 2004, when Gazprom for the first time deliberately disrupted gas supplies to Belarus, as well as a further transit to Poland and Germany, that switching off gas and oil pipelines has become a regular Russian practice. This has nothing to do with civilized business, because the question of price and the letter of the agreement is always a matter of agreement of both parties, and the third parties cannot suffer due to this. THE KREMLIN AND GAZPROM VERY WELL KNOW THAT WHENEVER THEY CLOSE VALVES TO UKRAINE OR BELARUS, THEY ARE CLOSING THEM FOR EUROPE AS WELL. The subsequent Russian "P.R." aerobics about how evil Ukrainians steal transited gas are spiteful, because in the given technological circumstances, Ukrainians simply do not have enough gas to power their transit compressors, and at the same time to balance their pipeline system. Targeted and repeated discrediting of Ukraine as a reliable transit country for gas and oil, should compel the Europeans to swiftly agree, and primarily to foot, the huge and unnecessary bills for the construction of new pipelines through the Baltic and Black Sea.
Are today's events surprising? For a considerable part of the EU they certainly are. European leaders, particularly those from key countries such as Germany, France and Italy, often prefer narrow commercial interests over international security interests of not only their EU partners, but even of their own citizens.
The real shock is experienced by those countries and governments that still have not done anything for the diversification of gas and oil, and remained totally dependent on the Russian supplies. All Slovak governments, and managements of SPP [Slovak Gas Company] up to date, have failed in this area. Let me be personal. For the past ten years, I have repeatedly emphasized the gravity of this situation in my various articles, analyses, as well as numerous speeches at various conferences, and personal meetings with various politicians.
For years, I have been frustrated over the fact that almost none of them considered this a problem. I was disappointed that representatives of investors repeated phrases about the reliability of Russian supplies, while they knew that the absolute priority of their domestic companies has always been diversification of supplies so that no supplier could blackmail them.
The responsibility for the situation in which we had to declare the emergency, and a real energy crisis is around the corner, is not borne only by Gazprom, but also by all responsible in Bratislava, because they were not properly prepared for this situation.
The hard lesson for citizens and businesses is, that not artificially low domestic prices should be the priority, but fair prices reflecting the highest possible reliability and continuity of supply from abroad.
What's the use of low price, if the pipe is empty? The case of diversification is similar to insurance. It is costly, but if my life, property or business is to be ensured against unexpected events and unfair partners it's a necessary expense. This is one but not the only reason why we have to urgently review the reality of our recently approved energy security strategy.
Nov 29, 2008
Nationalization of energy companies (Slovakia not Venezuela this time)
By Andrej Nosko
That Mr. Hugo Chavez, Venezuelan president, is not too 'fond' of foreign investors is no secret, but that he has a zealous follower in the fastest growing economy of the EU, Slovak Republic, is not that well known. Slovak Prime-minister, Robert Fico is recently gaining attention for his plans of restoring full state control, and ownership over (49% of) previously privatized assets as his way of winning (?) the price war against the partly state-owned gas supplier. The previous government of Mikulas Dzurinda (and Finance Minister Ivan Miklos), has succeeded in putting Slovakia on the global investor map, and provided solid basis for the current economic growth. In 2002, this government has also sold 49% 0f Slovak gas company, SPP - previously integrated (now legally unbundled) to the Slovak Gas Holding B.V., a consortium of Gaz de France and E.ON Ruhrgas. The remaining 51% of SPP's shares are held by the Slovak National Property Fund.
"You have nothing to do with it"
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"And Miklos"
"And Dzurinda"
Prime minister Fico, who in line with his political philosophy, has vocally opposed any and all privatization, is now, at least verbally, trying to get hold of the previously privatized assets, and calls for limiting the scope of private entrepreneurship in the country. Be it in the health care, pension, or energy sector. In this post I focus on the case of gas company SPP (although the story of Transpetrol deserves some interest as well). The current Slovak government doesn't believe in markets, and especially not in those in energy sector, and would like to dictate prices, and conduct social welfare policy by digging into the private pockets of foreign investors. To the calls, that prices of gas are into large extent dictated by Russian Gazprom, and SPP has to reflect rising prices on the wolrd markets Fico remains silent. When asked why Fico's government does not negotiate better prices of gas for Slovakia, he only replies that they would be stupid to do so if there are foreign co-owners to cover the costs of subsidizing the prices as well. The above cartoon says it all.
There are following options signalled by Mr. Fico to his co-owners of energy sector companies:
- either the private companies succumb to the political decisions (sometimes conveyed via the energy regulator) to keep their prices artificially low, conduct investments as Fico's government wishes, or
- their assets will be nationalized (threats to, SPP, Enel (EN: subscription required) article in SK), or
- the government changes the law in such a way to get the company to do what they want, or
- they sell their share back to the government (at the price they bought it for 6 years ago)
"Independent" regulator as a means of social policy
The story is not new. Chairman Fico, has been opposing the privatization since it was on the agenda. This is not incongruent with his party line. Since his party SMER got into the government, Fico has been struggling to gain control over the 'monopolies,' and the economy as a whole. The 'independent' regulatory body URSO (Regulatory Office for Network Industries), cannot be any longer seen as independent. To illustrate this point, we can quote the chairman of the regulatory board Jozef Holjencik, and his reaction to the alleged using of the regulator to promote social policy: "simply, it was interest of the state to protect them [households and small companies]. We respect that." That the work of the Slovak regulator is under political pressure was recently pointed out also by Blahoslav Němeček from the Czech regulatory authority during a recent conference in Bratislava.
Fight against 'the bad, bad capitalists' as a political marketing
Fico, was using the anti-capitalist rhetoric of class struggle against the corporations to get elected, and has never approved of the privatization (although very much needed for financing of the economic reforms (he did not approve of those either)). The price war (leaving the question whether he actually means it or its just a strategy of political marketing) of the government and the foreign investors in SPP has had so far three phases:
- Verbal threats of nationalization (August 2008)
- Attempts to change the conditions of privatization contract via change of legislation
- Concurrent Buy-back offer and change of Business Code (November 2008)
Although the foreign investors have minority of shares, at the time of privatization, they were given managerial control over the company - an element that has been a thorn in Fico's side since then - he has attempted to change the business law in order to change the conditions of the privatization contract, since that hasn't work out; he has threatened to expropriate the company, or offered an unrealistic buy-back at previous price (TA3, Téma dňa, 17.10.2008, 19h55) and finally succeeded in changing of the law (TA3, Téma dňa 04.11.2008, 19h55). Previously, an application for price increases to the URSO was a decision of the management. Now the general assembly of all stakeholders has to vote on the decision - thus state (with its 51% of shares) can block such decision.
Mr. Fico's argumentation is quite surprising, according to him (Téma dňa, 17.10.2008, 19h55), companies should follow the political decision of the government, or sell their shares back to the state at the original value (of 2002). Nonetheless, when the reporter asked him how this operation would be financed, prime minister only replied that he, "cannot say how this would be done, since they would do it in a similar way as buying back of Transpetrol (from Yukos Finance), but he cannot share details, in order not to threaten the Transpetrol buy back operation."
It is also important to remind in this context, what will happen according to Russian media (article in Russian, article in Slovak), after Slovak government buys back shares of Transpetrol from Yukos. If the Russian media is better informed, they might be handed to Russia, I have observed this eventuality already at the end of the previous post.
Absolutely surprising is how prime minister Fico, suggests to the co-owners of SPP to cross-subsidize the sales of gas. Pointing out the fact that SPP group is generating profit, nonetheless, he is indirectly hinting that SPP should subsidize the prices for households from the income from the transit-generated profits. The logic of this might be surprising to those in the EU, that are well versed in the Energy legislation. Slovak prime minister, although aware of this, is trying to push SPP to figure out how to bypass the anti cross-subsidization legislation in order to lower the prices for households. In the context, when the chairman of the regulatory board of URSO Jozef Holjencik also thinks that unbundling doesn't solve anything and only leads to higher prices (sic!), this comes at no suprise.
Finally, when a journalist asked, why state doesn't use its dividends (from the 51% shares) to cover for the protection of households, and to conduct the social policy directly, Fico only responded: why should only state cover for the costs of the household subsidies, [...] and if there is a 49% foreign shareholder, [...] they [state] are not stupid to cover it. (sic!)
Read more on Nationalization of energy companies (Slovakia not Venezuela this time)
Aug 28, 2008
Back to the Balkans. Volkswagen’s Relocation Plans and State-led Investment Promotion in Visegrad Countries.
By Michal Trnik, PERG guest author and MA IRES 2006 graduate
A recent news post concerning the alleged move of Volkswagen’s factory from Slovakia to Bosnia triumphantly lifted eyebrows of those who croaked the unstoppable and permanent eastward movement of foreign capital where the costs are irresistibly lower. According to these pessimistic prophets it was only a question of time when Central Europe cease to be interesting for foreign investors, which will result not only in its decreasing influx but also in direct relocations of multinationals’ production facilities.
The noticeable fuzz in Slovakia spurred by the announced VW’s plan to move whole production to Sarajevo was even magnified by citing no reasons for such a move. The ongoing silly season further boosted speculations on all fronts. Exorbitance of these catastrophic scenarios was refuted early on by Reuter’s refining follow-up, which confirmed only the relocation of small line that would have no direct impact on neither of VW’s two plants in Slovakia whether in terms of decreased production capacity or employment.
Panic is not justified. Not yet. Slovakia and other V4 countries in comparison to Bosnia still posses many FDI luring advantages. The decision of Europe’s biggest car manufacturer to start a new line of production in Bosnia rather than in Slovakia, however, sends a specific signal to Slovak government and other Central European countries as well. In particular, it serves as a good case for identifying persisting gaps in long-term investment promotion frameworks across the region.
Several speculative reasons why VW opted for Bosnia can be spelled out. Some argue that fundamental push factors that contributed to VW’s decision dwell in acute lack of skilled labor force, strengthening Slovak currency, sprawling anti-business rhetoric of current populist administration and end of tax holidays for the company. While others stress Bosnia’s pull factors such as incentives not subjected to strict EU limits, previous history of VW car production in Sarajevo and site’s potential to serve as testing grounds for further relocations.
Although none of the abovementioned reasons have to be directly responsible for the restart of VW’s production in the Balkans, they offer a larger picture concerning the state of current strategies to attract foreign investment in Slovakia and Central Europe. The Tatran Tiger’s economic success was largely generated by immense FDI inflows spurred by liberal reforms of Dzurinda’s governments. Most of investments came from at that time desired manufacturing industries, which helped to transform once economic laggard into the world’s biggest carmaker.
New challenges need fresh ideas. The V4 region soaked with manufacturing FDI demands new investment promotion approaches in order to move up the development ladder. Such strategy needs to be dynamic and has to reflect country’s development goals. In Slovakia, however, such scheme seems to be completely missing as can be seen on the country’s excessive and continuous reliance on automobile industry.
VW’s relocation to Bosnia certainly is not the first and will not be the last. Constantly rising wages in Slovakia and soaring world oil prices having detrimental effect on the car industry globally show obsolescence and fragility of country’s auto-industry focused investment promotion framework. Despite some indications of new winds blowing in minds of policymakers nothing like coherent, functioning and future-oriented investment promotion strategy was implemented. Although some minor diversification of FDI inflows into electronic industry occurred recently, Slovakia considerably lags behind in the amount of projects in high-tech, sophisticated services, IT or R&D. These require more brains than heavy machinery, can help transform the country into a modern service-based economy and make it less vulnerable to companies’ relocations. Slovakia’s close neighbors seemed to understand this some time ago.
The main regional leader in this respect is the Czech Republic, which continuously attracts sophisticated investments with high value added. The Hungarian investment strategy registered noticeable successes in form of highest FDI stock per capita in CEE and has a relatively better balanced structure as well. In fierce regional bidding wars for mega-investment projects, however, Hungary often does not hesitate to dig into taxpayers’ pockets in form of extra sweeteners offered to foreign investors. The case of Hankook Tire and speculations about Daimler’s recent investment are good examples of Hungarian generous aid to multinationals.
Daimler’s investment shows that V4 countries are still attractive for investors and can effectively compete with cheaper countries in the East even for large capital intensive investment projects. As Daimler is believed to be one of the last automobile investors in this region it is high time to rethink investment promotion strategy for those who did not do it yet. Czechs, Hungarians and even Poles did their homework on time and not only adjusted but also implemented their strategies oriented towards more perspective type of investments.
The age of massive capital and technology intensive manufacturing FDI inflows to the region is over. Forward looking investment promotion strategy is one of the necessary ingredients for further growth. Attracting investment in cutting edge technologies, services, R&D together with increased effectiveness of current production can become corner stone of its future economic success. Slovakia better learns this lesson quickly in order not to get caught unprepared face to face messages like that announced by VW.
August 28, 2008
Aug 17, 2008
Reforming Slovak primary and secondary education. Or not really?
By Katka Svickova
After the summer holidays, the roughly 830 thousand Slovak pupils and secondary school students should return into a different school than the one they left at the end of June. At least this is what the new Law on Education passed by the Slovak Parliament in May 2008 envisages. And at least for a part of the pupils at first, as the law will be implemented gradually. However, what this new school will ultimately really be like, and how new it really will be, is uncertain as the real changes can only be seen in the classroom and in a few years at the earliest. In spite of this uncertainty (or perhaps facilitated by it), the reform triggered a strong critical reaction.
Main features of the Slovak educational reform
On paper, the reform goes with the freshest winds of change blowing across Europe: education should be based on new, creative approaches, explorative, project- and problem oriented methods, on own activity and participation of the pupils in their education, on new content of subjects stressing competences and capabilities rather than memorized knowledge. The number of pupils or students per class should be reduced. Schools are promised more autonomy in determining the content and the form of the subjects taught. Parents, pupils and representatives of employers´ organizations should obtain more space for direct participation in the governance of schools and in the creation of educational programs. Last but not least, the choice between schools should be free and so should be the offer of educational opportunities. So can the pupils be looking forward to an educational paradise unfolding over the next few years?
Not really, say the critics. While they agree that the educational reform is long overdue, most of them call for its further postponement – for reasons connected both to its content and to the capacity of the current system to implement it. Indeed, the reform was really fast, and there was little time for a thorough public debate: the draft was presented in September 2007, the law was passed in May 2008 and its implementation starts in September 2008. In other countries, a similar process took normally between 3 and 4 years. In the Czech Republic, for example, the educational reform, launched in September 2007, was more thoroughly debated in its preparation phase and schools got more than 2 years to get ready for it.
Given the almost astronomic speed of the reform in Slovakia, the question is how significant changes it indeed brings. And if it really signals a watershed change - breaking with the traditional centralised system oriented at pupils cramming and reproducing facts - why the scope for the discussion was deliberately so limited. Reform of the educational system turns almost all members of the society into stakeholders. One would hardly find a person today, who would doubt that education is of crucial importance for the development of the individual as well as the whole society. Yet even the short time allowed for public debate could hardly hide lack of interest from the public.
What is really in the magic box?
The critics, who raised their voice most loudly, pointed out that the new law is not a reform at all but rather a bundle of atomistic and often second-rate regulations. Moreover, its effect will be contrary to the one promised. Instdead of more autonomy, it will bring more centralization and control. Yes, individual schools should create their own educational programs. Yet according to the critics, the binding framework educational programs set by the Ministry of Education, prescribing obligatory content and conditions of education, do not give much space for schools to add their own content. As a representative of a secondary schools association said, the secondary schools will copy the ministerial framework educational programme to 95 %. And yes, the law proclaims more freedom of choice; yet at the same time, there will be always only one textbook available for free for individual subjects, approved by the Ministry. The freedom of choice of school will allegedly be limited by the power of the Ministry to set limits for the number of pupils in the individual study programs of secondary professional schools. The critics also say that the reform does not address a serious problem of inequality of chances in education. (However, besides a call for personal assistants and an improvement of the quality of elementary education, they also do not suggest any concrete proposals how to solve this complex problem). In all, despite the huge need for reform, the new law does not deviate too much from the old system.
Perhaps, the character of the law was best pronounced by the Minister of Education, Jan Mikolaj, when presenting its draft: „Do not search for liberal values in this reform, I openly say, I think that we are not in such a deep mess.“ But perhaps, the audience should look for nationalistic values instead. The Ministry of Education is in the hands of the Slovak National Party, whose leader, Jan Slota, is (in)famous for numerous anti-Hungarian statements. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia feels the limitation in the choice of schoolbooks as a measure against them. No wonder - after a statement by Slota who called Stephen, the Hungarian king and saint who is depicted on the cover of a current textbook used by the minority, “a Hungarian clown on a horse.“ In its introduction, the law also states that one of the aims of education is to enhance the respect to national traditions, values and state language by all citizens.
What can pupils expect when they return to school in September?
Based on the Czech experience, where educational reform, on paper very similar to the current Slovak one, has been implemented since last September, not much groundbreakingly new should be expected from the initial phases of the reform implementation. The Czech discussion shared some similarities with the Slovak one. Its conclusions and lessons learned from a year of implementation indicate that much more depends on the individual teachers and school directors than on what is written on paper in the Ministry. Many schools started experimenting with new methods and new teaching approaches much earlier than they were told by the law. Those which did not want to or could not do this, just produced and handed in the obligatory school programe, and (with a few cosmetic changes) continued their business as usual. This might be the case of many Slovak schools too. Since indeed, the teachers and schools got very little time to prepare for the changes.
Although the critics of the educational reform in Slovakia pointed to some pertinent (but at the moment unresolvable) issues, the attention left several other, equally if not more important ones, in the background. In particular the issue of school financing, governance and teachers´ remuneration (and the level of autonomy schools really have here), the education and motivation of teachers (ensuring that they also actually have the competences they are expected to develop among the pupils in the classroom), or active involvement of stakeholders (especially parents).
All worth, at least, of prospective blog posts ;)
Aug 16, 2008
Nuclear Energy revival in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
By Andrej Nosko
Czech ambassador-at-large for energy Bartuska recently compared European countries' nuclear power policy to people, that want to legalize marijuana, while half of them already smoking in private, being afraid to admit it in public. In this post I look at three of these smokers - Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
Czech Republic, Slovakia as well as Hungary are experienced 'smokers.' Generating around 40%, 55% and around 40% of their electricity by nuclear respectively.
Czech Republic has two nuclear power plant (NPP) sites - Dukovany (2x WWER 440 / V213) and Temelín (2x WWER 1000). Slovakia has had two NPPs Jaslovské Bohunice (WWER 440 / V213) last two of its five units are scheduled for shutdown by the end of 2008 after the political decision during the EU accession negotiations; and Mochovce with two units functioning (WWER 440 / V213) and two more units foreseen to be completed in 2012 and 2013 respectively doubling its overall capacity. Hungary has a single NPP site at Paks, operating four WWER 440/V213 units (one of which was bought from Poland, after its nearly completed Żarnowiec NPP was abandoned)
The renewed interest in nuclear is not confined to CEE countries, whole world is reconsidering nuclear, since, although leaving many questions open, it currently is the only commercially tested and viable technology that provides CO2 free alternative to fossil fuels.
The debate was stirred-up again just before the Brussels summer holidays at July 2, 2008 conference, when Known supporter of nuclear energy, Hungarian MEP Edit Herczog (MSZP) mentioned that Hungary should increase its nuclear potential.
This comes at the same time as Czech ČEZ announced that it would double the capacity of its Temelín NPP, and Slovak PM mentioned at various occasions that political decision to close Bohunice NPP should be reconsidered, or a new NPP should be constructed at the site, as well as at other sites.
These moves are not limited to our three regional 'smokers,' Italy, country that shut down its NPPs after a referendum in 1987 has announced that it would go nuclear again. Poland, which after a local referendum suspended construction of its first NPP seems to be reconsidering its anti-nuclear stance and should join the 'smokers' club by 2020.
Although nuclear is currently the only viable solution if EU is to stay true to its aims of cutting the CE2 emissions, it is not without problems. Most of the EU countries have not considered answers to the question of spent fuel and associated waste. Also the question of nuclear proliferation is one that needs to be taken very seriously. Nonetheless, just like with the smoking, pretending that it doesn't happen is not helpful, we need to talk about the associated problems and weight the solutions.
EDITED 18/12/2008:
On December 18, 2008 Slovak government announced its selection of Czech national energy champion CEZ, as its strategic partner for construction of the 5th unit. This should be done by a common company with shares of 49%CEZ and 51% Slovak government to be set-up next year. New NPP unit should be operational in 2020. Minister of economy Jahnatek mentioned 7 points criteria for selection, including (quoting Minister Jahnatek):
- ability and experience with building 3rd generation reactors
- whether the company is vertically established in Slovakia
- opportunities and ability in terms of dynamic stability of transport network and grid
- sufficient financial backing
Minister mentioned EdF and Enel as trailing in the second group behind CEZ, according to government information, 10 companies were in the selection process.
The event gain attention in Slovak news primarily through the voiced criticism of government for not announcing a open competition, or transparent selection of this strategic partner.
May 14, 2008
Reversing of oil pipelines
By Andrej Nosko
“Slovaks want to import oil from Czech Republic” reads the headline of a news feature, run on April 15, 2008 by a Czech daily E15. This story has been copied by all major Czech and Slovak news hubs. Even if one subtracts the bombasticism and ‘exclusivity’ common to the lay journalists, this news is surprising and makes one wonder about three things: authenticity of the news on ongoing negotiations, relation of this news to the wider context, and timing of this message.
Authenticity of news
It is difficult to question the authenticity of the information, whether any negotiations are ongoing between Czech and Slovak administrations, since usually these kinds of negotiations are kept confidential. Tomáš Bartovský, the spokesperson of Czech ministry of Industry and Commerce was quoted by E15 as affirming the ongoing negotiations. The direct quote refers to the situation that “would concern solving of potential supply outages,” no further context of this comment is provided. The daily further quotes director of Czech oil pipeline operator MERO ČR a.s . Jaroslav Pantůček, as saying that reversing of pipeline would cost couple of tens of millions CZK (10M CZK approx. 400k EUR), and that Slovaks would have to finance this operation. The daily further notes, unavailability of any further information on negotiations between Slovaks and German operator of TAL pipeline which feeds in the IKL from the Mediterranean port of Trieste, and which would be a necessary condition for the Slovak-Czech deal to have any substance.
Relation to the wider context
The context and timing of this message is rather bizarre. First of all, the idea of reversing Druzhba to supply Slovakia through TAL-IKL is not novel. When the IKL has been conceived in what was back then called Czechoslovakia, it was a preferred project over an idea of connecting refinery in Slovak capital of Bratislava (Litvinov 5.4 MT/yr, Kralupy 3.3 MT/yr.) to the AWPpipeline (annual capacity of 10 MT/yr) leading to the refinery close to Austrian Capital in Schwechat. (capacity of 9.6 MT/yr) which is also supplied by TAL, but unlike the branch leading to the refinery in Ingolstadt, the capacity of AWP is projected only for the needs of Austrian refinery, and thus rather limited for transporting additional supplies. It was preferred, because connector to Ingolstadt would provide for the possibility of supplying also Slovak part of the federation. Nonetheless, this possibility has to be seen in the wider context. The supplying of Slovakia through TAL-IKL would mean prolonging the transit from the oil exporting country, than loading of oil to a oil tanker, offloading the tanker in Italy, shipping it through Italy, Austria, Germany and Czech Republic further to Slovakia. When one puts this barrel of oil into such a globetrotter context, other reversing plans come to the picture as well.
The most interesting is the possibility for Ukraine to reverse its pipeline between Odessa and Brody to supply its western neighbors with oil from the modern port of Odessa should the exports of Russian oil through Druzhba cease.
Furthermore, the context of the reversing of pipelines has the other side or rather, other direction, as well. Czechs are discussing reversing of IKL to export Russian oil since the early times of IKL has been put into operation, and its capacity has been rather underutilized. This would nonetheless entail changing the technology of the Kralupy refinery, since it is currently unable to process high-sulphuric sorts of pipeline-Urals oil from Russia.
Additional option, envisaged by Transpetrol (owned by Jukos Finance) and OMV already in 2003 is the possibility of building the connector to Schwechat, this option is still on the table.
Timing of the message.
Another question that one can be wondering about, is why has this information been released now? Is it just a coincidence, or is it a part of some information game? Just few days before this message was released, Russian PM visited Slovakia, and a major Slovak daily Sme juxtaposed coverage of his visit in Slovak and Russian media. On the first sight it is quite clear, that Mr. Fico (Slovak PM) met a different Russian PM and Mr. Zubkov has apparently met a different Slovak PM than Mr. Fico, since these two people referred about their meeting in such a different ways. Nonetheless, this question should be dealt with in a different post.
by Andrej Nosko
